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The present paper advances knowledge on the antecedents of firms’ 
environmental proactivity, assessing the explanatory power of 
corporate governance issues. In particular, our aim is to explore the 
relationship between board structure and firms’ proactive 
environmental strategies, within the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory frameworks, in order to outline if particular 
types of board members could represent a stimulating driver for 
firms’ environmental proactivity. The theoretical analysis is 
completed by an empirical investigation, performed by two linear 
regression models, on a sample of European firms, belonging to 
different polluting industries that were included in the Carbon 
Disclosure Project questionnaire 2014. The industry choice is 
related to the increasing pressure for better environmental 
performance that polluting industries are nowadays experiencing 
because of stakeholders and legislation requests. The results show 
that board structure and composition matters in firms’ 
environmental proactivity and have implications for managers, 
shareholders, and regulators who are interested in influencing 
firms’ environmental proactivity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Antecedents of environmental proactivity are an 
increasingly important area of study for 
management scholars. In recent years, in fact, it has 
become evident that the success of a business is no 
longer defined only by monetary gains but also by 
the impact that the activities of an organization have 
on society as a whole. Achieving sustainability is, 
therefore, one of the most relevant challenges for 
society and firms. 
In particular, companies may play a crucial role 
in order to reduce the global environmental impact 
of the present society (Carballo-Penela and 
Castromán-Diz, 2015); that’s why the commitment 
to the natural environment has become an important 
variable within the current competitive scenarios 
(Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006) and 
environmental performance is increasingly 
considered a strategic issue for firms. This is 
particularly true for firms belonging to polluting 
industries which are more and more forced to 
change their attitude towards green issues (Bansal, 
2005; Sharma and Enriques, 2005): the emerging 
consumers’ preference for greener products and 
services, together with the pressure operated by 
stringent governmental regulations and by 
stakeholders (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006) and media 
are, in fact, requesting corporate managers to adopt 
better environmental behaviors (Kock et al., 2012). 
These behaviors, in particular, may range in a 
continuum between two extreme positions 
(Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006): a 
passive, or reactive, strategy, by which companies 
decide to perform only the necessary actions in 
order to meet regulatory requirements; a proactive 
conduct, specific of firms that voluntary introduce 
policies and actions to prevent or decrease their 
impact on the natural environment. 
As there is a growing evidence that a proactive 
environmental strategy may help firms to gain 
competitive advantage, such strategy, and in 
particular its drivers and impact on business 
performance, has been an object, in the last few 
years, of an ongoing debate (Russo and Fouts, 1997; 
Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Menguc et al., 
2010; Delmas et al., 2011). 
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The Organizations and Natural Environment 
literature has, in fact, extensively developed on the 
drivers of firms’ proactive environmental strategies, 
focusing on a variety of antecedents, such as: 
regulation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), stakeholder 
pressure (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), firm’s 
ethical attitude (Bansal and Roth, 2000), industry 
structure (Claver et al., 2007), geographic location, 
company’s size, its position in the value chain 
(Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006) or the 
perception of new business opportunities (Bansal 
and Roth, 2000). A few studies have recently 
explored the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firms’ environmental performance 
and proactivity (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; 
Earnhart and Lizal; 2006; Kock et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2012a; Wu et al., 
2012b; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 
2013; Calza et al., 2016), trying to understand if 
there are mechanisms that may influence managers 
towards green practices, but the relationship 
between corporate governance, in particular board 
structure and composition, and firms’ 
environmental proactivity has not been sufficiently 
investigated and the debate is still open. The few 
studies on the issue have provided fragmented and 
contradictory empirical evidence that makes theory 
building difficult (Walls et al., 2012). 
The present paper wants to contribute to the 
extant literature by analyzing the relationship 
between corporate board’s structure and firm’s 
environmental proactivity, in order to visualize if 
some types of directors (non-executive directors, 
independent directors or female directors) or 
particular features of the board (size and one tier or 
two tier system) could act as a stimulating driver for 
firms’ proactive environmental strategies. 
Using a sample of European firms belonging to 
polluting industries that responded to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) 2014, this study highlights 
the importance of a firm’s board in the development 
of companies’ proactive environmental conducts, 
contributing to the understanding of the 
antecedents of such strategies in several ways. 
Firstly, it focuses the attention on the 
understanding of the relationship between board 
structure and composition and firms’ environmental 
proactivity, while most of the extant studies 
examined the linkage with environmental 
performance (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-
Correa, 2013; Walls et al., 2012; de Villiers et al., 
2011). Moreover, while most of the studies 
investigating this issue are focused on Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in particular US (Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia, 2009; de Villiers et al., 2011; Kock et al., 2012; 
Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2013; 
Cowden et al., 2015; Post et al., 2015) or single 
developing countries (Meng et al., 2013; Earnhart 
and Lizal, 2006), our analysis is focused on 
companies belonging to different European non 
Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular France, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Austria and Switzerland). 
Finally, as our measure of environmental 
proactivity covers other countries all over the world, 
our findings on the relationship between firms’ 
board and PESs may have implications in other 
countries and could stimulate future comparative 
analyses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: the next section reviews prior studies on the 
drivers of firms’ proactive environmental strategies 
and, in particular, the relationship between 
corporate board structure and environmental 
proactivity, and it develops the research hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the data and the adopted 
methodology. Section 4, instead, develops the 
descriptive statistics and the results of the analysis, 
together with a formal discussion of the 
implications of the results. Lastly, in the final part of 
the paper, the main findings and limitations of the 
study are summarized. 
 
2. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND FIRMS’ PROACTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES: CONCEPTUAL 
FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The Organizations and the Natural Environmental 
scholars (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998) defined proactive environmental 
strategies (PES) as the reduction of a firm’s 
environmental impact and the management of the 
relationship between business and nature beyond 
imposed compliance (Sharma, 2000; Aragon-Correa 
and Sharma, 2003; Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-
Benito, 2006). Thus, a firm that adopts a PES is 
trying to anticipate future regulations and trends, 
designing and managing new and alternative 
operations, processes, and products in order to 
prevent (instead of simply correct) negative 
environmental impacts (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 
2003). 
A proactive environmental strategy may be 
ideally seen as the last stage of a firm’s 
environmental efforts (Hunt and Auster, 1990) and it 
is usually characterized by the presence of four 
basic elements: (a) regulatory proactivity, (b) 
operational improvements, (c) organizational 
changes, and (d) environmental reporting (Delmas et 
al., 2011). In other words, a proactive environmental 
strategy is not just a firm’s reaction to regulation, 
but it implies the adoption of advanced 
environmental oriented organizational systems and 
measures in all management decision areas 
(Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006). 
Menguc et al. (2010) defined, in particular, a PES a 
construct that is composed of two dimensions: 
pollution prevention and management support of 
natural environmental issues. 
Several studies have recognized that the 
introduction of environmental proactivity may be 
used by companies to gain competitive advantage 
toward competitors, enhancing their position in the 
market and developing the resources and 
capabilities in order to build a long-term profit 
potential (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Buysse and 
Verbeke, 2003; Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003). 
Firms with high environmental performance may, in 
fact, reduce operating costs, improve access to 
resources and take advantage of market 
opportunities created by an increasing demand for 
environmentally friendly goods and services 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). 
Consequently, a number of scholars from 
different fields of study, have tried to identify and 
analyze the drivers that may encourage a company 
to develop and sustain its environmental proactivity, 
together with its environmental performance. 
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Prior studies have classified environmental 
drivers in organizational, or internal, and contextual, 
or external (Ghobadian et al., 1998; Gonzales-Benito 
and Gonzales-Benito, 2006; Claver et al., 2007). 
Essentially, environmental regulation (Ambec and 
Barla, 2006; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Majumdar and 
Marcus, 2001) and stakeholder pressure (Buysse and 
Verbeke, 2003; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; 
Garcés-Ayerbe et al., 2012) represent the external 
factors, while companies’ structural features, 
together with organisational resources and 
capabilities (Hunt and Auster, 1990; Gonzales-Benito 
and Gonzales-Benito, 2006), managerial attitude and 
motivation (Fernández et al., 1996; Hunt and Auster, 
1990), leadership capability (Azzone and Noci, 1998) 
and intellectual capital (Claver et al., 2007) 
constitute the internal ones, all moderated by the 
presence and strength of ethical attitude (Husted, 
2005). 
Among the internal drivers, a recently growing 
stream of literature has examined the linkages 
between corporate governance issues and firms’ PES, 
challenging the role of ownership structure as well 
as board composition, but the few studies on the 
issue have provided contradictory results and the 
relationship should be further exploited. A more 
developed literature is focused on the effects of 
corporate governance issues on corporate social 
responsibility and performance (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; 
Fernandez Sanchez et al., 2011; Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1995; Setò-Pamies, 2015), but in these 
studies the environment represents only a single 
dimension of the complex nature of CSR, leading the 
researchers to narrow the attention on 
environmental issues. 
Most of the papers have their roots in the 
agency problem caused by the separation between 
management and ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and are focused on 
“how some corporate governance mechanisms 
resolve the divergence of interests between firm 
owners (principal) and managers (agent) with respect 
to environmental practices” (Kock et al, 2012, p. 
493): in particular, the presence of blockholders or 
other types of owners (family members, state and 
market ownership, institutional ownership) (Berrone 
et al., 2010; Craig and Dibrell, 2006; Darnall and 
Edwards, 2006; Earnhart and Lizal, 2006; Habbash, 
2015; Calza et al., 2016), executive compensation 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Cordeiro and 
Sarkis, 2008), the market for corporate control (Kock 
et al., 2012), the composition of the board of 
directors (de Villiers et al., 2011) and equity based 
incentive plans (Kock et al., 2012). 
As regards, in particular, the relation between 
boards and firms’ environmental proactivity, we 
tried to summarize the most relevant studies on the 
issue in Table 1. 
As reported in Table 1, the debate on board 
structure, composition and ties as potential drivers 
of firms’ environmental issues is still open, with 
most of the studies focused on Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in particular U.S. (de Villiers et al., 2011; 
Kock et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-
Correa, 2013; Cowden et al., 2015; Post et al., 2015) 
and on environmental performance and disclosure, 
instead on firms’ environmental proactivity. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) found, in particular, 
that board size and the presence of executive 
members on the board are positively related to 
environmental litigations, while Kock et al. (2012) 
reported a positive association between the 
environmental performance of a firm and the 
presence of pro-stakeholder directors in the board. 
A direct relationship was also found in case of 
presence of independent directors, legal experts and 
board size (de Villiers et al., 2011). 
Post et al. (2015) reinforced the previous 
results finding a positive relationship between the 
representation of women and independent directors 
on a firm’s board and sustainability-themed 
alliances. Such alliances, in turn, positively 
contribute to corporate environmental performance. 
In the same direction, the analysis of Rao et al. 
(2012) found a significant positive relationship 
between the extent of environmental reporting and 
the proportions of independent and female directors 
on a board. 
Few studies have also focused on the board’s 
ability to create ties and relations with the external 
environment through board interlocks. The 
influence of director interlocks on the value 
generated by the social capital of the board may, in 
fact, improve corporate environmental performance 
(Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2013). 
Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2012), in particular, 
reported that board interlocks may enhance or 
inhibit the adoption of PES: director interlocks with 
firms providing knowledge-intensive business 
services are beneficial for the adoption of PES, while 
those with fossil fuel suppliers and financial 
institutions are found to be negatively related. 
Moreover, such mechanisms seem also positively 
connected with environmental performance, 
especially when a firm is linked to a larger parent 
company and in cases of low and high levels of 
interlock diversity (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-
Correa, 2013). 
As Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and de Villiers et 
al. (2011) pointed out, the resource dependence 
theory and the agency theory may provide the 
general theoretical frameworks for analysing how 
the size and the composition of the board can affect 
firms’ environmental proactivity. Boards, in fact, 
have usually different functions (Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2005), namely: providing information and 
other resources (asserted by the resource 
dependence theorists) and monitoring the 
management and aligning its interests to those of 
shareholders (followed by the agency theorists). 
Integrating the two perspectives will contribute to a 
complete understanding of how they may affect 
firms’ proactive environmental strategies and “can 
help overcome current myopia within the two 
streams of research” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, 
p.383).
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Table 1. Overview of the studies on the relationship between board of directors and firms’ environmental issues 
 
Corporate Governance Issue Study Theory Independent Variables Dependent Variable(s) Sample Relationship 
Board 
de Villiers et al. 
(2011) 
Agency theory and 
Resource Dependence 
theory 
Director independence, CEO-chair duality, 
directors appointed after CEO, CEO-director 
ownership, inside and outsider director 
ownership  
Environmental performance 
(number of KLD 
environmental strengths) 
2,151 observations from 
1,216 firms on KLD 
Database 
+/-/0 
Board 
Cowden et al. 
(2015) 
Resource Dependence 
theory 
Green corporate human capital, green 
regulatory human capital, green relational 
capital, cumulative green board capital 
Environmental performance 
(number of KLD 
environmental strengths) 
1,461 board members from 
143 U.S. firms selected 
from the Standard & Poor’s 
500 list 
+/0 
Board 
Post et al. 
(2015) 
Upper Echelons theory, 
Resource Dependence 
theory 
Women directors, independent directors 
(with the mediating role of sustainability-
themed alliances) 
Environmental performance 
(annual changes in the KLD 
indicators of a firm’s 
environmental strength) 
36 U.S. oil and gas firms 
that were listed in the 2009 
Forbes.com Special Report, 
The Global 2000 
+ 
Board 
Kassinis and 
Vafeas (2002) 
Stakeholder theory 
Board size, director affiliation, director 
reputation, inside ownership and outside 
stakeholder pressure 
Environmental litigations 
362 firms out of which 209 
with environmental 
violations 
+/- 
Board 
Ben-Amar and 
McIlkenny 
(2015) 
Agency theory Board effectiveness 
Voluntary Climate Change 
Disclosure 
559 Canadian firm 
(included in the CDP 
questionnaire) year 
observations 
+ 
Board Li et al. (2017) Upper Echelons theory 
Board gender diversity (measure of 
Teachman, 1980), moderated by PLC of the 
industry 
Environmental policy (KLD 
database) 
865 publicly listed firms on 
the NYSE (U.S.) 
+ 
Board/management 
Walls and 
Hoffman (2013) 
Behavioral governance 
approach 
Environmental experience of the board, 
board network centrality 
Positive environmental 
deviance (based on KLD 
data) 
Unbalanced panel data set 
of 294 U.S. listed firms 
from 2000 to 2008, for a 
total of 1,881 observations 
+/- 
Board/management 
Kock et al. 
(2012) 
Stakeholder theory and 
Agency theory 
Presence of stakeholders on the board, 
equity-based managerial incentives, market 
for corporate control, legal and regulatory 
system 
Environmental performance 
(firm’s amount of waste 
released - IRRC data) 
568 observations from 337 
U.S. firms 
+/- 
Board/management 
Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al. 
(2012) 
Resource Dependence 
theory 
Director interlocks (with environmental green 
equipment suppliers, firms providing 
knowledge-intensive services, financial 
institutions, and fuel suppliers)  
Firm’s adoption of Proactive 
Environmental Strategies 
(PESs) 
90 investor-owned U.S. 
electric utilities 
+/-/0 
Board/management 
Ortiz-de-
Mandojana and 
Aragon-Correa 
(2013) 
Resource Based View 
(RBV) and Contingency 
Perspective of the 
social capital theory 
Director interlocks (moderated by firm’s 
business proactivity, size of parent 
company), industry’s diversity interlock ties 
Environmental performance 
(derived from the Global 
Warning Potential GWP- of 
the firm emissions) 
93 investor-owned U.S. 
electric firms 
+/0 
Board/ownership Rao et al. (2012) Agency theory 
Independent non-executive directors, female 
directors, board size, institutional investors, 
firm’s independence (BVD factor) 
Environmental disclosure 
96 Australian listed 
companies 
+/0 
Board/ownership/management 
Walls et al. 
(2012) 
Fact-based exploratory 
study 
Institutional ownership, investment turnover, 
shareholder activism and concentration, 
board independence, environmental 
committee, board diversity, board size, CEO 
duality, managerial control, CEO 
compensation 
Environmental performance 
(using KLD dataset) 
313 Standard & Poor’s 500 
firms (2,002 firm-years) 
+/-/0 
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The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) views organisations as 
operating in an open system and needing to 
exchange and acquire certain resources to survive, 
creating a dependency between firms and external 
environment. In this framework, boards are 
positively seen, as they may provide valuable 
expertise and capabilities, influence and aid in 
strategy formulation and help in connecting the firm 
with stakeholders (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-
Correa, 2013). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in 
particular, asserted that boards may provide four 
benefits: advice and counseling, legitimacy, channels 
of communication with the external organizations 
and preferential access to outside elements. 
In this way, larger boards, with a variety of 
directors, may expand existing board member 
networks and contacts and help firms to better 
understand and respond to their stakeholders (Boyd, 
1990), also in case of natural environmental issues. 
Boards with a high number of members, in fact, are 
more likely to include experts on specific topics 
such as environmental issues (de Villiers et al., 
2011), that could provide the expertise to manage 
green subjects and take advantage of environmental 
opportunities that may arise. 
Therefore, following the results of de Villiers et 
al. (2011), that showed how environmental 
performance tends to be higher in firms with larger 
boards, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Larger boards are positively related to 
firms’ environmental proactivity. 
Within the resource dependence theory, 
diversity in general, and differences in gender in 
particular may very likely enrich the resources and 
capabilities of a board, producing unique 
information available to management for better 
decision making. The more diverse a board is, the 
wider the variety of perspectives, the broader the 
knowledge and expertise, and the greater the access 
to different networks (Post et al., 2015). 
One considerably debated characteristic of 
board diversity is gender. Female directors are, in 
fact, likely to have different educational and 
professional backgrounds from those of male 
directors, bringing different perspectives to the 
board (Hillman et al., 2002). In addition, women on 
boards tend to be more democratic and participative 
in decision-making processes, leading the board to 
achieve better decisions (Bear et al., 2010). 
A large body of research suggests that women’s 
values are more closely aligned than men’s with 
corporate social responsibility (Zhang et al., 2013; 
Setò-Pamies, 2015) and, as corporate directors, they 
tend to possess certain psychological characteristics 
that may make them more sensitive to different 
stakeholders’ claims. According to Ibrahim and 
Angelidis (1994), female directors exhibit greater 
responsibilities: in their analysis, they found that 
women are more philanthropically driven and less 
concerned with economic performance. 
Environmental, ethical, and caring values are likely 
to affect the decision-making process when women 
assume the power positions usually held by men 
(Post et al., 2015). 
Following the studies on CSR, some researchers 
found out that women have a more protective 
attitude towards the environment (Wehrmeyer and 
McNeil, 2000) and are more likely than males to be 
ecologically conscious (Park et al., 2012); 
subsequently, corporations with a higher proportion 
of women in the board showed better environmental 
performance (Walls et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015; Li 
et al., 2017) and higher levels and quality of 
environmental reporting (Rao et al., 2012). 
Therefore, following the extant literature on the 
theme, we hypothesize that: 
H2: A higher percentage of women on the board 
is positively related with firms’ environmental 
proactivity. 
Following the agency theory framework, the 
board of directors is an internal control mechanism 
used to ensure that management behaviour is 
consistent with the owners’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Agency 
theorists, in fact, see the primary function of a 
board as monitoring the actions of managers 
(agents) in order to protect the interests of owners 
(principals). Such monitoring activity is important 
because of the potential costs that may incur when 
managers follow their own interests: vigilant 
directors could effectively reduce such costs, 
demanding explanations for managers’ strategic 
paths and criticizing not clear initiatives. 
A board should not only fulfill its responsibility 
in monitoring agents and protecting shareholders 
but also, more importantly, in managing 
stakeholders. Board’s directors may, in fact, exert 
pressures over managers in order to have strategies 
and actions that satisfy shareholders (and 
stakeholders) interests. Therefore, they should be 
able to influence executive managers to adopt 
proactive environmental strategies that could help 
firms to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. 
An effective control depends, in particular, on 
whether the directors are non-executive and 
independent (professional managers with expertise 
in monitoring activities, who have incentives to 
exercise control in order to maintain their 
reputational capital). Independent directors should 
be, in fact, primarily interested in aligning with 
stakeholder interests, being more responsive than 
insiders to stakeholder pressures, in order to 
maintain and enhance their reputation and obtain, in 
this way, new directorships. Moreover, they are more 
likely to be conscious about how corporate social 
issues may improve a firm’s standing towards 
investors, government, and lenders (de Villiers et al., 
2011). 
de Villiers et al. (2011) and Post et al. (2015) 
found, in fact, a positive relation between the 
presence of independent directors and firms’ 
environmental performance, following other studies 
focused on corporate social responsibility (Ibrahim 
and Angelidis, 1995). 
Rao et al. (2012), instead, showed that 
independent directors’ representation is positively 
related to corporate environmental reporting. Thus, 
following the mainstream literature, we hypothesize 
that: 
H3: A higher percentage of non-executive 
directors in the board is positively related with firms’ 
environmental proactivity. 
H4: A higher percentage of independent 
directors on the board is positively related with firms’ 
environmental proactivity. 
Board structures are not homogeneous across 
countries, and, even in the same country, it is 
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possible to adopt different governance systems 
(Weimer and Pape, 1999). The company law in many 
European nations allows, in fact, listed ﬁrms to 
adopt a two-tier board (as opposed to a unitary 
board) composed of a Management Board and a 
Supervisory Board. The dual board structure ensures 
the independence of the two boards by making sure 
that executives are not too powerful and the 
Supervisory Board has the duty of protecting 
stakeholders’ interests. Such board, in particular, is 
usually composed by a different set of stakeholder 
representatives (employees, banks, other financial 
institutions, key clients, public officials, and so on), 
that could also be related to environmental and 
sustainability issues. Thus, the presence of a two-tier 
board seems to increase the environmental 
competencies of the different directors, enhancing 
firm’s commitment to green issues, in comparison to 
those adopting a one-board system. The Supervisory 
Board, in fact, could represent an effective 
instrument for protecting social and environmental 
issues. Therefore, following the aforementioned 
argument, we hypothesize that: 
H5: The adoption of a two-tier board is 
positively related with firms’ environmental 
proactivity. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we explain 
variations in firms’ environmental proactivity using 
two OLS regression models, where board structure 
and composition constitute the primary explanatory 
variables. This methodology has already been used 
to predict the relationships between several 
variables and different metrics of environmental 
engagement or performance (Majumdar and Marcus, 
2001; Surroca et al., 2010; Habbash, 2015), so it 
appears to be an appropriate method of analysis. 
 
Variables’ measurement 
 
The measurement of a proactive environmental 
strategy is always considered a difficult task. 
Previous researchers have used different types of 
indexes: qualitative measures based on mail surveys 
(Aragon-Correa, 1998; Craig and Dibrell, 2006; 
Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2005; Garces-
Ayerbe et al., 2012), environmental performance 
indicators provided by institutional agencies (Kock 
et al., 2012), or the decision to invest in different 
environmental practices, such as renewable energy 
generation (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2012). 
As most of the employed indexes are subjective 
and are mostly related to environmental 
performance, we decided to employ an 
environmental proactivity index that could measure 
the extent of management commitment to 
environmental issues. 
Following other studies in the environmental 
management literature (Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 
2010; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 
2015; Calza et al., 2016), we, therefore, decided to 
employ the Carbon Disclosure Score (CDS) as a 
proxy of firms’ PES. Such index that may range from 
0 to 100 is a specific measure of the extent of 
management commitment to climate change and 
environmental disclosure, and, consistent with the 
definition provided by Delmas et al. (2011), the 
measure of firms’ environmental disclosure could be 
considered a proxy of environmental proactivity. 
The measure is calculated yearly by the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), an independent, not for 
profit organization that, among other reports, 
provides environmental and climate change data of 
worldwide companies and cities through an annual 
questionnaire. 
Such questionnaire covers different topics, 
such as the emission reduction strategies adopted, 
technologies, products, processes or services the 
company develops or applies in response to climate 
change, the extent to which a company has 
measured its carbon emissions, and the frequency 
and relevance of disclosure to key corporate 
stakeholders. 
A CDS smaller than 50 indicates limited or 
restricted ability to measure and disclose risks and 
opportunities that come from carbon emissions and 
environmental concerns. On the contrary, companies 
with a CDS higher than 70 show a deeper 
involvement in climate change issues. These 
companies identify environmental management as a 
tool for achieving strategic advantage and including 
climate change-related risks and opportunities into 
their core business. 
We decided to assign the value 0 to the 
companies that do not have a score as they did not 
answer to the CDP questionnaire, or asked to not 
show the results, as a sign of low environmental 
proactivity. 
In particular, we used the company's Carbon 
Disclosure Score (CDS) 2014, collected from 
different 2014 CDP climate change reports, as the 
dependent variable (i.e. firms’ environmental 
proactivity).  
As regards, instead, the independent variables 
related to firms’ board structure and composition, 
we collected the data from the companies’ annual 
reports and corporate governance reports 2013, 
together with Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Database. In particular, we considered the 
percentage of non-executive directors (NON-EX), 
independent directors (IND) and women (WOM), 
present in the board. We also considered board size 
(SIZE), as the total number of directors appointed to 
the board, and a dummy variable to measure the 
employed board structure in the firm (CGSYSTEM). 
The variable assumes value 1 for companies that 
have a two-tier board and 0 for firms that adopt a 
one-tier board. 
To test the hypotheses we selected a set of 
control variables, already identified and used in 
extant literature as relevant drivers for firms’ 
environmental proactivity. These are: the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s annual capitalization (CAP) 
as a proxy for size (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-
Benito, 2006); company’s return on equity (ROE) as, 
following the slack resources theory, Waddock and 
Graves (1997) found that higher levels of CSR could 
be driven by higher financial conditions; company’s 
longevity (LONG), as usually environmental 
performance and proactivity increase over time 
(Hass, 1996) and the Carbon Dioxide Emission (CDE) 
as a proxy of environmental regulatory stringency. 
Consistent with Kassinin and Vafeas (2006) and 
Berrone et al. (2010), it is supposed that country’s 
CO2 emissions are inversely related with regulatory 
stringency and, as a consequence, with environ-
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mental performance. The definition and measure-
ment of all the variables used in the analysis are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Definition and Measurement of the variables 
 
Group Code Variable Measurement Predicted sign 
Dependent Variable CDS 
Environmental 
Proactivity 
Carbon Disclosure Score 2014 
 
Independent Variables 
 
NON-EX 
Non-Executive 
directors 
% of non-executive directors on 
the board 
+ 
IND 
Independent 
directors 
% of independent directors on 
the board 
+ 
WOM Gender diversity 
% of women directors on the 
board 
+ 
SIZE Board Size 
Total number of board 
members 
+ 
CGSYSTEM Board structure 
Dummy variable: 1= two-tier 
board; 0= one-tier board 
+ 
Control Variables 
  
CAP Market capitalization 
Natural logarithm of market 
capitalization in 2014 (Euro)  
+ 
LONG Company's age 
No. of  years since company's 
foundation 
+ 
ROE Return on Equity 
Company’s Return on Equity in 
2014 
+ 
CDE 
Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (CO2) 
Country’s CO2 emissions (metric 
tons per capita) in 2011 
+ 
 
Sample 
 
The sample used in the study consists of the 
European companies that were included in the 
Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire 2014. We 
decided to focus the attention on the companies that 
the CDP selected in Switzerland and Austria (168), 
Italy (100), France (250), Spain and Portugal (125), as 
the largest in terms of market capitalization, 
because they all belong to non-Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance systems and present 
comparable ownership and board structures. We in 
fact intentionally excluded all the companies 
belonging to countries where the ownership 
structure and board composition of firms are very 
specific, as in the case of Germany, in which large 
companies must follow the principles of the 
codetermination law in the composition of the two-
tier boards. 
We then selected only the companies operating 
in pollutant industries that are increasingly facing 
pressure from stakeholders and media towards 
better environmental impact. In particular, we 
considered the firms belonging to the following 
environmentally sensitive industries: mining, oil, 
gas, chemicals, paper, iron, steel and other metals, 
electricity (with the exception of renewable energy 
producers), gas and water distribution.  
Our final sample is therefore composed of 149 
firms of different European countries (France, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal). 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, we used two OLS 
regression models, where the Carbon Disclosure 
Score is the explained variable and board structure 
and characteristics constitute the primary 
explanatory variables. The Descriptive statistics, 
frequency and Pearson’s correlation coefficients of 
the variables used in our analysis are presented in 
Tables 3 and Table 4. 
 
Table 3. Frequency and descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std Dev % Min Max 
CDS 40.9597 42.4603  0 100 
SIZE 9.1544 4.0332  1 23 
NON-EX 0.6687 0.3326  0 1 
IND 0.4428 0.3264  0 1 
WOM 0.1234 0.1259  0 0.5 
CGSYSTb   14.80   
CAP 7.3367 1.7927  3.59 12.00 
LONG 67.1477 59.5445  0.00 288.00 
ROE 8.7228 24.34742  -148.31 160.36 
CDE 5.6276 0.9810  4.60 7.80 
a n=149;   b % of cases where CGSYSTEM=1 
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The average value of the Carbon Disclosure 
Score is 40.9597, with a standard deviation quite 
high of around 42.46. As regards the independent 
variables, the average size of the board of directors 
is 9 members, with a minimum size of 1 director 
and a maximum of 23 members. 
Regarding board composition, the presence of 
non-executive directors is larger than the 
independent ones: the average percentage of the 
first typology in the board is around 67%, while 
independent directors cover on average 44% of the 
total board members. Conversely, the presence of 
women in the board is quite low: only 12.34% of the 
board positions are, indeed, covered by women. A 
dual system of corporate governance is instead 
present in the 14.80% of the sample. 
 
Table 4. Pearson Correlation 
 
  CDS SIZE NON-EX IND WOM CGSYST CAP LONG ROE CDE 
CDS 1 
         
SIZE .336** 1 
        
NON-EX .198* .599** 1 
       
IND .344** .375** .706** 1 
      
WOM 0.070 .276** .291** 0.102 1 
     
CGSYST -0.080 -.600** -.840** -.576** -.291** 1 
    
CAP .576** .367** 0.151 .327** 0.081 -0.005 1 
   
LONG 0.144 0.001 0.139 .164* -0.007 -0.029 0.109 1 
  
ROE 0.077 0.051 0.075 -0.017 -0.071 -0.120 0.149 0.088 1 
 
CDE -0.031 -0.139 -.433** -.349** -.251** .405** -0.019 -0.119 0.026 1 
a n=149   **. Significant at 0,01 (2-tails); *.  Significant at 0,05 (2-tails) (Pearson's index) 
 
Board size presents a high correlation with the 
other board’s characteristics. In particular, the larger 
is the board, the higher are the percentages of 
independent (0.375; p-value <0.01), non-executive 
(0.599; p-value <0.01) and woman (0.276; p-value 
<0.01) directors in the board and firms’ 
capitalization (0.367; p-value <0.01). Conversely, 
board size is negatively related to board structure: 
the size of two-tier boards is significantly smaller (- 
0.6; p-value <0.01) than one-tier boards systems. 
Boards of directors with a higher percentage of 
women are those that have the higher percentage of 
non-executive directors (0.291; p-value <0.01). The 
higher presence of non-executive directors is related 
to two-tier systems (-0.840; p-value <0.01) and to a 
higher percentage of independent directors (0.706; 
p-value <0.01). 
The Pearson correlations also reveal a 
significant positive correlation between the Carbon 
Disclosure Score (CDS) and board size (0.336; p-
value <0.01), the percentage of non-executive 
directors (0.198; p-value <0.05) and independent 
directors (0.344; p-value <0.01). The CDS is also 
positively correlated with capitalization (0.576, p-
value <0.01). 
We then investigated the relationship that 
exists between board structure and composition and 
firms’ environmental proactivity. We, therefore, 
developed two regression models (Table 5): the first 
model considers only the effect of board 
characteristics on CDS, while in the second model 
the control variables are inserted.  
Regression results for Model 1 show that 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, board size (SIZE) has a 
significant positive impact on CDS, so the higher the 
number of directors in a board, the higher is the 
level of environmental proactivity. The result is 
consistent with the resource dependence theory and 
with the provisions of de Villiers et al. (2011). Such 
directors seem to effectively provide the expertise 
useful to manage environmental issues and take 
advantage of environmental opportunities that may 
arise. Large boards are more likely to possess the 
bundle of competencies and expertise required to 
enhance environmental proactivity. 
Moreover, consistent with Hypothesis 4 and 
following de Villiers et al. (2011) and Post et al. 
(2015), we found a positive relation between CDS 
and the percentage of independent directors in the 
board (IND). The result follows the agency theory 
and provides evidence of the monitoring role of the 
board. As board’s independence increases, the 
ability of directors to control management’s 
activities towards environmental issues tends to be 
higher. 
The association between firms’ PESs and the 
percentage of women (Hypothesis 2) in the board is 
instead not significant, even if correctly signed. We, 
therefore, failed to find any relationship between 
firms’ environmental proactivity and gender 
diversity of the board (WOM), contrary to extant 
literature focused on corporate social responsibility 
(Setò-Pamies, 2013) and environmental performance 
(Walls et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015). This is probably 
due to the low percentage of female directors 
present in our sample: as reported by Bear et al. 
(2010), in fact, the effectiveness of women on boards 
tends to increase with the addition of female 
directors: minority voices are not easily expressed or 
heard in groups. 
Our results are also not consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, as a higher percentage of non-
executive directors in the board (NON-EX) is not 
related to a statistically significant increase of firms’ 
environmental proactivity (CDS) and the coefficient 
is also not correctly signed. This finding does not 
follow the mainstream literature, like Johnson and 
Greening (1999): maybe, non-executive directors are 
still too closed to management and are not able to 
fully exploit their monitoring function. Finally, 
model 1 confirms that two-tier boards (CGSYST) are 
positively associated with CDS: the presence of a 
Supervisory Board is probably enhancing the 
protection of stakeholders’ interests, also regarding 
environmental issues, leading the management to 
higher levels of environmental proactivity. 
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Table 5. Regression analysis results 
 
 Model 
Variable 1 2 
SIZE 
4.736** 2.291* 
(0.984) (0.984) 
NON-EX 
-4.032 -4.787 
(20.744) (19.2961) 
IND 
57.448** 27.969* 
(13.746) (13.905) 
WOM 
8.000 -5.206 
(13.746) (25.0699) 
CGSYST 
50.538** 15.708 
(16.447) (16.657) 
CAP 
 10.508** 
 (2.078) 
LONG 
 0.085 
 (0.050) 
ROE 
 -0.003 
 (0.123) 
CDE 
 0.585 
 (3.363) 
Constant 
-33.890** -76.402** 
(15.677) (25.389) 
Observations 149 149 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.245 0.376 
F-Statistics 10.088** 10.381** 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
**. Significant at 0,01 (2-tails); *.  Significant at 0,05 (2-tails)  
 
When control variables have been inserted 
(model 2) the regression fit increased (Adjusted R-
Squared = 0.376). Among control variables, just 
firm’s capitalization, considered as a proxy of 
company’s size (CAP =10.508), positively affects 
firm’s environmental proactivity. However, the 
introduction of control variables reduces the effect 
of board structure and composition on CDS. In 
model 2, the positive and significant coefficients 
related to the percentage of board size (SIZE) and 
independent directors (IND) decrease in value, while 
the variable “board system” (CGSYST) becomes non-
significant. It means that firm’s size, longevity, 
profitability and environmental regulatory 
stringency seem to primarily affect company’s 
environmental proactivity, partially neutralising the 
pressure exerted by the board. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present paper addresses the nature and 
intensity of the relations existing between board 
structure and composition and firms’ environmental 
proactivity. 
In this regard, founding on agency theory and 
resource dependence theory assumptions, the 
manuscript investigates the role of board size, board 
composition (percentage of women, non-executive, 
and independent directors) and structure (two-tier 
or one-tier board) in affecting the proactive 
orientation towards environmental issues of a 
sample of non-Anglo-Saxon European firms 
belonging to pollutant industries. 
Indeed, the results of the two OLS regression 
models provide evidence that boards do affect firms’ 
PES. Our main findings suggest a positive 
relationship between board size or the presence of 
independent directors in the board and companies’ 
environmental proactivity, measured by the Carbon 
Disclosure Score 2014; while the percentage of 
women and non-executive directors, together with 
the structure of the board (one-tier or two-tier board 
system), do not seem to be related to firms’ 
proactive environmental strategies. 
Our study presents some limitations that may 
be ironed out in future studies. The first limitation is 
related to the measurement of firms’ environmental 
proactivity. We used the Carbon Disclosure Score 
generated by a voluntary self-reporting process 
(CDP). This is a reliable index, but it may lead to 
including in the analysis mainly companies that are 
already biased towards environmental proactivity 
and who may want to report it. Moreover, including 
in the sample non-respondent companies and firms 
that asked to not show their results with a CDS of 0, 
could raise problems regarding the continuous 
nature of CDS; future studies should evaluate the 
possibility to convert CDS in a categorical variable. 
Finally, we investigated firms’ environmental 
proactivity in a quite specific context: namely 
polluting industries operating in developed 
economies, that have both a strong environmental 
regulation and environmentally conscious 
consumers. 
Despite such limitations, however, this 
contribution provides some valuable research 
implications, useful for researchers and academics, 
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but also for managers and public authorities, as the 
results allow to identify the characteristics of the 
board that may foster and enforce firms’ 
environmental proactivity, as a mean for reaching 
sustainability. Companies, in fact, may play a 
significant role in the reduction of man activities’ 
impact on natural environment and in the 
promotion of a more ecologically sustainable world. 
Moreover, socially responsible funds could find 
useful, for their portfolio allocation strategy, to 
know if there are types of more oriented to green 
issue. 
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